The RAF Strike - India, 1946

On September 2nd 1945 the Japanese formally surrendered in Tokyo Bay. Millions of Allied soldiers, sailors and airmen celebrated and eagerly awaited their return home.
Throughout the Far East, camp debating societies flourished, becoming lively centers of discussion about the new post-world world. A Forces Parliament was set up in Rangoon but was soon closed down by a worried officialdom because of its anti-colonialist declarations. At home a new Labour government was elected. In Europe, American forces in Germany were holding mass parades for speedier demobilization. In Java that Christmas, British Paratroopers of the 7th Parachute Battalion staged a protest strike against their use in assisting the Dutch to reestablish colonial rule in Indonesia.
In January 1946, some five months after the end of the war, the airmen of RAF Bamhrauli, India, were preparing for their morning parade. The station warrant officer, looking out from his office across the parade ground, watched the Indian pipe band begin to form up. Outside the “other ranks” huts 2,000 British airmen began to assemble, and moved off in columns towards the parade ground.
The station warrant officer noted proudly that the airmen looked particularly smart and well disciplined as their marching columns converged on the parade square. Then, for him, the unthinkable happened. As each contingent arrived at the periphery of the parade ground they veered smartly away, marching determinedly towards the huge camp cinema. The RAF station had gone on strike!
Inside the cinema, a vast converted hanger, the airmen sat quietly. They heard the sound of the pipe band play the officers onto the parade ground, and the bugle sounding the general salute as the RAF Ensign was raised. They watched and sat silently as, shortly afterwards, the CO and his staff walked onto the cinema stage. At the SWO’s command 2,000 airmen came smartly to their feet. The CO stepped forward; clearly shaken by the event he told the men to sit, and asked for their explanation.
Speaker after speaker from all parts of the cinema stood up in turn. They said that their action was directed against neither the officers of the RAF. They wanted to go home now that the war had ended. Demobilisation was painfully slow for men who had been away from their families for three, four or even five years without home leave. They were civilians who had willingly done their duty for their country at war, but were not prepared now to have their return delayed for reasons of imperial policy.
The airmen’s demands had been drawn up the previous evening in the camp canteen. All the lights had suddenly been extinguished and one airman, disguising his voice with a pencil held in his mouth, had acted as organizer. It had been agreed that there would be no obvious strike leaders. Delegates from every hut would serve on the strike committee; discipline was to be firmly maintained, and officers would be saluted but otherwise ignored. All essential services would be kept running under committee instructions, and there would be close control of the armoury. This was considered as especially vital because there had been stories circulating that striking airman at RAF Jodhpur had had their camp surrounded by Indian State troupers. The main aim of the strike, it was agreed by the airmen, would be to obtain a firm statement from the government itself of a speedy demobilization.
On airfield after airfield across the Middle East and Far East a similar pattern of events was taking place. The strikes appeared to follow a course via Transport Command stations on the trunk routes through the Middle East and India. News was spread by sympathetic aircrews as well as by teleprinter. India soon knew all about strikes at Almaza camp, near Cairo, and at Lydds airfield in Palestine.
The first news about the RAF strikes reached the British public on January 24th when The Times reported that 2,000 airmen at Mauripur, the main air trouping center in India, had began a “stay in strike”. Not reported was that the airmen had addressed a petition to the new Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, saying: “We have done the job we joined up to do. Now we want to get back home, both for personal reasons and because we think it is by work that we can best help Britain. No indication has been given of when we will see our families again. Is it because the government wishes to talk tough with other powers?”
On January 26th an Air Ministry statement admitted that “airmen at several overseas stations have recently staged a so-called “strike” on account of grievances, real or imaginary, about the rate of demobilization”. The statement then ended with a warning. “There is in all services a proper and recognized method of representing grievances and serious breaches of discipline such as those which have done harm to the good name of the RAF in the past few days have the strongest disapproval of His Majesty’s Government, and will not be tolerated”.
Meanwhile the long-range teleprinters from Mauripur and other striking airfields carried the strike news to airmen throughout South-east Asia. At Dum Dum, the Calcutta airfield, 1,200 men stopped work. Four thousand airmen at Seletar, Singapore, held massive parades to demand the presence of the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia. They were eventually addressed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, SEAC. After a stormy meeting Park reported, “...the vast majority of airmen are loyal and hard working, but a few strike promoters have shown they are determined to stage sit down strikes as a means of bringing pressure on the home Government”.
At airfield level, relations between the striking airmen and the majority of officers were respectful where they were not friendly. There was always a strong sense of loyalty between all ranks in the RAF. The Times reported on January 27th: “Twelve hundred men below the rank of sergeant at Dum Dum, the Calcutta airfield, have been on strike since midnight on Friday. The men have no complaints against the authorities at the camp, with whom they are on the best of terms. The commanding officer had a friendly discussion with them when notice of the strike was given. A delegation of the strikers talked with Air Commodore Battle, Group Captain Slee, who commands the station, and with Major Wyatt of the Parlimentary delegation visiting India, who communicated with the Air Ministry.”
With the strike now spread across the Far East - Cawnpore, Mauripur, HQ Group Karachi, Palam (Delhi), Poona, Vizagapatam, Allahabad, Dum Dum, Kallang, Seletar, Chakulia and Negombo had stopped work - Air Vice Marshal Sir Roderick Carr, AOC, BAFSEA, signaled the Air Ministry: “I deplore the action of the airmen, but owing to the widespread nature of the incidents I cannot suggest any alternative to a general Government statement.”
On January 28th Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor assured the Air Council that the Air Ministry would support them in firm action, although it was “obviously not desirable to call in the Army”. The authorities did not know how best to deal with the situation.
A few days later, on February 1st. Sir John Slessor signaled to Sir Keith Park and Sir Roderick Carr: “The only way of dealing with these incidents is to identify the ringleaders and deal with them immediately by court marshal. No doubt there is difficulty, but is it impossible? … It seems to me probable that many airmen are ignorant of the seriousness of their actions and possible consequences; in particular this habit of describing a mutiny as a strike tends to obscure the seriousness of it”.
The “habit” of describing the airmen’s action as a “strike” was a constant source of irritation to the authorities as well as to a number of MP’s throughout this period. Thus, on January 30th, in Parliament, Sir William Darling (Consertive, Edinburg South) wanted to know the difference between a strike in the RAF and a mutiny in the Army. This evoked Tory shouts of “Answer!”. Mr. Strachey said, “It might do a great deal of harm to use a severe word in describing the incidents”. The Air Minister was, of course, well aware of a situation which a later Court of Inquiry was to underline: “…. the overwhelming majority of men were merely civilians in uniform”. Indeed, as RAF tradesmen - fitters, riggers, electricians, carpenters, radio and radar mechanics - they were skilled civilians in uniform, all necessary in rebuilding a post-war Britain.
Although the Air Ministry took the view that the spread of the strikes “suggested that they had in their origin something of the work of professional agitators”, remarkably few arrests were made. RAF Special Investigation Branch men were infiltrated into a number of camps. The deeply suntanned airmen took delight in spotting the newcomers’ white knees and red faces.
There were reports of some 20 airmen detained for a short period in the Middle East. At Seletar, Singapore, two airmen were arrested: one of them LAC Willoughby, was found to be a nephew of a distinguished Army officer, Major General Kerr CB OBE MC. Both the airmen were soon released. At Cawnpore, Cpl Stone and LAC Noble were arrested and imprisoned in Bombay, while at Karachi LAC Attwood joined them in jail after court marshal. The usual procedure, however, was to post airmen the authorities considered to be “trouble makers” elsewhere. In his February 16th report on his tour of units in Sumatra and Java, Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park wrote, “…. found in Batavia a corporal who is believed to have been one of the instigators of the mass disobedience at Joghpur, but there is not sufficient evidence for trial by court marshal. However, the man is under close observation and the incident shows how disaffection can spread beyond India by normal postings”.
The full weight of military discipline fell on AC Norris Harold Cymbalist, a radar operator at RAF Base HQ, Singapore. Cymbalist was charged with incitement to mutiny and with insubordination. Evidence was given at his court marshal that he had called on three hundred airmen at Kallang to strike in sympathy with those on strike at Seletar and had used insubordinate language to a squadron leader. He was sentenced to 10 years penal servitude and discharged with ignominy.
A substantial volume of protest built up in Britain when news of the arrests reached the general public. A number of MPs raised the matter in Parliament. As a result of the public pressure Cpl. Stone and LAC Noble were released after serving two months of their imprisonment. LAC Attwood was subsequently released on medical grounds, having suffered a breakdown. In the House of Commons, The Air Minister, Mr. Strachey, announced that the sentence on Cymbalist would be reduced to 5 years.
By the end of January 1946 the striking airmen began to return to normal duties in response to assurances on speedier demobilization. The first strike in the history of the RAF was over. The airmen had succeeded in compelling the government to speak to them directly about their return home.
THE COURT OF INQUIRY.
A court of inquiry was set up in February 1946. It found that the airmen’s complaints had not been directed against their own officers or RAF authorities. Conditions at some of the camps were bad - 6,000 men at Seletar were accommodated on a station built for half that number. The strikes had followed a similar pattern and had common demands. There was no evidence of intimidation or violence against regular or loyal airmen. The authorities had no warning because censorship of mail had ceased the previous October. The court noted that the overwhelming majority of men were merely civilians in uniform.
Although it was becoming daily more apparent that there was now a more urgent concern about the airmen’s welfare and demobilization, the authorities were determined not to lose face. On February 28th. Air Chief Marshal Slessor, in a signal to Sir Keith Park and Sir Roderick Carr, suggested a statement should be issued to challenge any impression of improvement as a result of recent mutinies: “….not a single man will get out of the RAF one day earlier as a result of these mutinies”.
In that month of February 1946 the Royal Indian Navy mutinied, seizing 20 ships in Karachi and Bombay harbours. Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park reported that the Royal Indian Air Force could not be counted upon in the crisis and therefore the use of RAF bombers would be considered. A few days later the revolt was suppressed. As the bombers circled overhead the naval mutineers surrendered unconditionally.
Almost exactly one year later Lord Louis Mountbatten was sent to India as Viceroy to effect the transition to Indian independence and the end of British power in the Far East. The “civilians in uniform” may perhaps have sniffed that wind of change a year earlier, but by now most of them were back home with their families and the mutiny was receding into a strange memory.
PERSONAL
This article by Bernard Shilling and published in the December 1986 issue of Aeroplane Monthly, was passed to me in 2001 by a friend living in Portland, Oregon, USA. He knew I had been in the RAF and served in India during World War 2 therefore thought it would be of interest to me. It certainly was.
It is the first article I have seen about the RAF strike in which I was involved. At the time I was stationed at 322 MU Cawnpore, a station of some 5,000 RAF personnel. We had meetings in a darkened hanger at which a spokesman advised us of the proposed strike and why it was thought necessary.
It was all about the rate of demobilization. Instead of coming to pick us up, the two largest ships Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth were being used to ferry GI brides from England to the USA and this inflamed our discontent. Each year some airmen died from the 120 degree heat that Cawnpore experienced in the summer so our desire to get out of India and return home now that the war was over was very strong indeed. All the officers and NCOs (who could not join the strike) were in favour of it, they felt exactly the same as the airmen.
During the strike all essential services were maintained, eg: Guard Duties, Hospital and medical facilities, cookhouses, etc. but all flying and work on aircraft was curtailed. Some officers tried to use the petrol bousers to refill aircraft, but not knowing how to operate the equipment, they eventually gave up. Any services other than those considered essential could only be undertake with the consent of the airman who was in charge of the station strike.
It was later rumored that at the request of higher command, our commanding officer was required to disclose the name of the strike leader and that the signals personnel refused to send the signal that gave the name. We had no idea that the strike was so widespread and thought it was confined to the thirteen RAF stations in India.
There is no doubt in my mind that as a result of the strike the rate of demobilization quickened considerably. I was indeed delighted when, about two months after the end of the strike, I was able to see what all of us longed for - the sight of India disappearing over the stern of the ship!
In 1944, in convoy aboard the “Stratheden”, the journey from Liverpool to Bombay via the Suez Canal had taken four weeks. The return trip on the “Otranto” in 1946 at full speed ahead took about 20 days. When the ship’s loudspeaker system announced that on the port bow the most southerly part of England, Start Point, could be seen, the ship leaned to port as around 5,000 troops rushed to the rail to have their first look at England after years away.

David van Vlymen
Portland, Oregon, USA.
March 2002.
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